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Appeals of Orders Compelling Arbitration in
Embedded Proceedings Must Wait
Altman Nursing, Inc. v. Clay Capital Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) afforded courts
with specific guidelines to follow in determining whether an order dealing with the
arbitrability of a dispute is appealable. One issue, however, was not settled by the
language of this statute. Altman Nursing, Inc. v. Clay Capital Corp. addresses this
unresolved issue of whether an order compelling arbitration in the context of an
embedded claim can be classified as final and immediately appealable.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Altman Nursing, Inc. (Altman) and Clay Capital Corp. (Clay) included an
arbitration clause in their stock purchase agreement.2 When the parties could not
agree on Altman's contract obligations, Altman filed various claims in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, but did not seek to compel
arbitration.' Clay did, however, seek to compel arbitration in a motion
accompanying various counterclaims.4 The court granted Clay's motion to compel
arbitration.5 Altman appealed, and Clay moved to dismiss the appeal.6
Clay's motion to dismiss the appeal asserted that the motion to compel
arbitration should be classified as an "embedded" proceeding, one in which some
relief is sought apart from the order mandating or prohibiting arbitration.7 An
embedded proceeding typically involves the merits of the dispute and is
distinguished from an independent proceeding, one in which the dispute's
arbitrability is the sole issue before the court.' Clay maintained that under the FAA,
which allows appeal of an order compelling arbitration only if it is final, an
embedded proceeding, unlike an independent one, is not subject to interlocutory
appeal.9
I. 84 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996).






8. Id at 770-71.
9. Id at 770. Relevant parts of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16) read as follows:
(a) An appeal may be taken from-
( 3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
1
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Although Altman conceded that this case involved an embedded proceeding,
it argued that the arbitration order was final because it sent all claims to arbitration,
thereby ending the litigation proceedings.'0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal,
holding that an order mandating arbitration in an embedded proceeding is always
interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable under the FAA."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before the passage of § 16 of the FAA in 1988, the jurisdiction of an appellate
court over a district court's order compelling arbitration was decided under 28 U.S.C.
§ 129112 and § 1292. 1 Section 1291 provided that the "courts of appeals... shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States.. ." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). As a result, the issue under § 1291 was
whether the motion compelling arbitration could be classified as final. Courts found
that when a motion to compel was brought in an independent proceeding, it was final
and appealable. Courts, however, differed in their opinions when the motion was
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may
not be taken from an interlocutory order-
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
9 U.S.C. § 16.
10. Id. at 771.
11. Id. at 771-72.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 states that the "courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States...." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(1) allows the courts of appeals to have jurisdiction of
appeals from interlocutory orders only in a few cases:
(a) [The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions ....
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof...,
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the
rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final
decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988).
[Vol. 1997, No. I
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embedded, meaning part of other litigation. 4 When the motion was embedded,
some courts classified the order compelling arbitration as final, while others
classified it as interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable.'" This disagreement led
to uncertainty and frustration of the FAA's goals.' 6
Some courts looked to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292 to determine if the appellate court
had jurisdiction over the district courts order compelling arbitration. Section 1292,
which allows for interlocutory appeals of decisions involving injunctions, also led
to a split in the court system. There were decisions which allowed appeals from
orders granting a motion to stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration, from
orders granting an injunction against arbitration, and from orders granting or denying
a motion to compel arbitration.' 7 Other courts, however, held that an order
compelling arbitration was not appealable as an injunction.'
The enactment of 9 U.S.C. § 16 has done much to unify the law of appellate
jurisdiction in this area. Section 16 generally denies immediate appeal of pro-
arbitration orders and allows appeal of refusals to compel arbitration. There is still,
however, at least one issue upon which courts disagree: Can an order compelling
arbitration and made during on-going proceedings be classified as final and,
therefore, appealable under § 16(a)(3), which allows for appeal of "a final decision
with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title?"' 9
Clearly, the majority of the circuits have adopted a rule which distinguishes
between independent proceedings and embedded proceedings. A proceeding is
independent and final if the arbitrability of the dispute is the sole issue before the
court.20 Such proceedings occur when a party seeks an order compelling or
prohibiting arbitration, or when a party seeks a declaration of whether the dispute is
arbitrable, and no party seeks any other relief." By comparison, an embedded
proceeding is one in which a party has sought some relief other than the order
requiring or prohibiting arbitration.' In the majority of circuits, an order compelling
arbitration in an independent proceeding is considered final and appealable, while
an order compelling arbitration in an embedded proceeding is considered
interlocutory and nonappealable.23
14. Edith H. Jones, Appeals of Arbitration Orders-Coming Out of the Serbian Bog, 31 S. TEx L.
REV. 361,373 (1990).
15. For examples of the various approaches taken by courts faced with this issue, see id at 374.
16. d. at 363.
17. Id. at 365.
18. Id. at 370. Among the cases arriving at this holding were In re Hops Antitrust Litigation, 832
F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir. 1987); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 1985);
Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 712 F.2d 724, 729 (1st Cit. 1983); Lummus Co.
v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
19. 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(3).
20. Humphrey v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1993).
21. Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Intl Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
22. Id.
23. Once the arbitration has occurred, the party opposing arbitrability will have an opportunity to
raise that issue in a motion to modify or vacate the award. Id. at 60-61.
1997]
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The Sixth Circuit rejected the independent versus embedded approach in
Arnold v. Arnold Corp."' and relied instead on the legislative history of § 16 of the
FAA. The court emphasized a quote from the Committee on the Judiciary which
states that the policy favoring arbitration is not determinative of whether appeal is
allowed under § 16.' Rather, says the Committee, all final judgments are appealable
in the interest of the policy allowing appeals once there is nothing left for the district
court to do.26 The Arnold court interpreted the Committee's comment as rejecting
the use of the distinction between independent and embedded orders to determine
whether appeal is available."
The result of this Sixth Circuit holding is a split of authority on the issue of
whether an order compelling arbitration in an embedded proceeding can ever be final
and, therefore, appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 1 6(a)(3).
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In analyzing its case, the court in Altman first noted that the majority rule
classified an order compelling arbitration as final if it was independent, but as
interlocutory if it was embedded.28 The court then considered Altman's position.
Altman, relying on the Arnold v. Arnold Corp. case,29 argued that the order to
arbitrate, though it was embedded, was also final because it completely ended the
litigation.3 °
The Fifth Circuit quickly rejected this line of reasoning along with the Arnold
holding and adopted a black-letter rule providing that an arbitration order involving
an embedded claim is always interlocutory and that an order involving an
independent claim is always final.3"
The court's arrival at this rule was based considerably on precedent. The court
cited an earlier Fifth Circuit case, McDermott International, Inc. v. Underwriters at
Lloyds, 32 as well as cases from several other circuits.33 Although the Fifth Circuit
in McDermott did not hold that there could never be an interlocutory appeal from an
24. 920 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1990).
25. Id. at 1274-75.
26. Id. at 1275. The Committee included as examples of final judgments "a final judgment in an
action to compel arbitration, a final judgment that refuses to enjoin arbitration, or a final judgment
dismissing an action in deference to arbitration." Id. at 1274-75.
27. Id. at 1276.
28. Altman, 84 F.3d at 770.
29. 920 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1990).
30. Altman, 84 F.3d at 771.
31. Id.
32. 981 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
33. Altman, 84 F.3d at 771; see Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93, 95 (8th
Cir. 1994); Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilerrich Intl Corp., 984 F.2d 58,60 (2d Cir. 1993); Prudential Insurance
Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994); Adair Bus Sales v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d
953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994); Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1993); Perera v.
Siegel Trading Co., 951 F.2d 780, 785 (7th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 1997, No. I
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embedded proceeding, the Altman court felt that this black-letter rule was strongly
supported by the McDermott holding.34
After noting that only the Sixth Circuit in the Arnold case has allowed an
interlocutory appeal from an embedded proceeding, the court proceeded to reject the
Sixth Circuit's approach which was based on the legislative history of the Arbitration
Act.3" The Altman court, instead, agreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Perera v. Siegel Trading Co. 36 In Perera, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that if
Congress had intended to change the traditional judicial interpretation of the term
"final," it would have done so explicitly in Section 16 of the FAA.37
Based on the Fifth Circuit's prior holdings and the holdings of the
"overwhelming majority of other circuits," the Altman court set down the clear rule
that orders involving embedded proceedings are always interlocutory and never
appealable, while orders involving independent proceedings are always final and
always appealable.3
V. COMMENT
Though the Altman case follows precedent and the majority rule, it is the first
case in the Fifth Circuit to use such definite language in order to classify a
proceeding involving an embedded claim as always interlocutory and a proceeding
involving an independent claim as always final. 39
Accordingly, there are two major policies that clash in this case. The first is the
policy of allowing immediate appeal of decisions that seem final in the sense that
they put an end to litigation. The other is a policy encouraging arbitration and other
means of alternative dispute resolution, which in the long run generally saves the
parties time and money.
On one side of the debate are the views set forth by the Sixth Circuit in the
Arnold v. Arnold Corp. case. In Arnold, the Sixth Circuit held that even an
embedded order can be considered final if it effectively puts an end to the
litigation.' While this view appears to be antagonistic to the pro-arbitration purpose
of § 16 of the FAA, the Arnold court points out that the policy favoring arbitration
must stand alongside the policy allowing appeal when the district court has made a
final determination.4' The Sixth Circuit's reasoning has strengths. The policy of
allowing appeal from a decision which seems final gives parties assurance that they
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 951 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1992).
37. Id at 784-85. The phrase "final decision" has been given meaning by judicial interpretation in
cases deciding whether a lower court decision is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.
38. Altman, 84 F.3d at 771.
39. Id.
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can rely on the court system to correct an erroneous order which forces them to
arbitrate.
The court in Altman, however, rejected the holding in Arnold and promoted the
pro-arbitration policy behind § 16. By making orders compelling arbitration of
embedded claims unappealable, the Fifth Circuit (and most other circuits which have
reached similar holdings) appears to have taken another step toward promoting
alternative dispute resolution. It is, in a sense, allowing a trial judge to force the
parties to arbitrate and to postpone any appeal until the arbitration is over.
In some instances, at least, this may successfully dispose of the case as far as
the courts are concerned. For example, if the party who initially opposed the
arbitration is satisfied with its result, it is likely that there will never be an appeal.
Even if the party is not satisfied with the result of arbitration and the arbitration is
overturned on appeal, the work that both parties invested in the arbitration process
will be helpful at trial.42
For some, denying appeal of arbitration orders involving embedded claims does
not go far enough. Some pro-arbitration advocates feel that even when orders
compelling arbitration are independent and final, they should not be appealable until
after the arbitration has occurred.43 Part of the reasoning behind this view is that
increased opportunities for judicial involvement in the process may disparage pro-
arbitration goals, tie the parties up in litigation, and directly conflict with the purpose
of § 16 of the FAA.' Proponents argue that even though denying appeal of
independent orders to arbitrate would not necessarily undermine the policy of
allowing the appeal of final judgments," the fear of that happening may have kept
it out of § 16 in the first place. At any rate, because such a construction of § 16 does
not seem possible and because it would require a legislative amendment, the Fifth
Circuit in Altman appears to have gone as far as it can go to minimize appeals of
orders compelling arbitration.
Beyond a pro-arbitration policy, the Altman black-letter rule should serve a
policy of efficiency in the court system when it comes to such cases by increasing
predictability and by reducing claims which are unlikely to succeed. It is doubtful
that any party would argue before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that an order
on an embedded claim can also be final after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Altman
which harshly rejected the reasoning in Arnold. On a broader scale, however,
efficiency could suffer. If a court wrongly orders arbitration in an embedded
proceeding, the losing party will have to go through with the arbitration, appeal
afterward, and then see the decision reversed. Although the effort put into the
42. Jones, supra note 14, at 375.
43. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary; (West), Paragraph 5, 354 (1996); 9 U.S.C.A. §16
(1988).
44. Siegel, supra note 43, at paragraph 5, 352-57 (1996).
45. Id. Siegel states that "the deferral of an appeal from a 'final' district court decision in favor of
arbitration would advance [the final judgment policy] by getting the case expeditiously before the
arbitrators on the merits and letting the arbitrability point go up only afterwards." He also points out that
a "final" decision to compel arbitration does not end the dispute in the sense that a final decision on the
merits does. It simply determines the forum in which the dispute will be heard. Id. at 354.
[Vol. 1997, No. I
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arbitration probably will not be entirely wasted, time will certainly be lost - both the
time invested in the arbitration process and the delay in taking the case up on appeal.
In summary, though it may have been the inevitable result of the precedent
leading up to it, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Altman closes the door on any
possibility of immediate appeal in that circuit when a trial court compels arbitration
in a case involving an embedded claim. At first glance, the Fifth Circuit's decision
appears to promote arbitration among disputing parties and promote efficiency in the
courts. The achievement of these goals, however, depends on the reaction of future
contracting parties. This decision and those like it may actually cause parties to
hesitate before including any kind of arbitration clause in their contract for fear that
courts will have too much power to construe the clause to force arbitration in all
cases. The results remain to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Altman decision is simply a culmination of the precedent leading up to it
combined with a black-letter rule. It clears up any uncertainty that may have
previously allowed parties to challenge a court's order compelling arbitration in an
embedded proceeding. Based on this decision, such a challenge in the Fifth Circuit
can never occur until after the arbitration takes place. It is possible that other circuits
which have generally followed the same reasoning as the Altman court will adopt the
same black-letter rule that arbitration orders in embedded proceedings are always
interlocutory and never immediately appealable. Unless the Sixth Circuit drastically
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